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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 20070747-CA
Plaintiff,
vs.
DARIN RICHARDSON,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Appellant, DARIN RICHARDSON appeals from the Judgment, Sentence,
and Order for Commitment from the district court. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Was Mr. Richardson denied his state and federal rights to due
process of law when, at sentencing, the district court found him in breach of the
plea agreement based solely upon the State's unilateral representation that Mr.
Richardson breached the agreement?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court's ruling regarding the
enforceability of a plea agreement is a question of law" that is reviewed for

correctness, "according no deference to the trial court's conclusions." State vf
Stringham, 17 P.3d 1153 (Utah App. 2001) (citations omitted).
The question of whether a breach is material is generally a question of fact
"unless the facts are undisputed; then it is a question of law for the court."
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. 1997). Normally an
appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the district court's findings of fact
and demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings
even when viewed in a light most favorable to the district court. Id. at 1210.
However, in this case the district court made no factual findings but instead
concluded Mr. Richardson had not complied with the plea agreement based on the
State's unilateral representations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 9, 2005, Mr. Richardson was charged with a third degree
felony for Criminal Non-support in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-7-201. Rl-3.
On or about March 7, 2007, Mr. Richardson pled guilty as charged pursuant to the
terms of the parties' negotiated plea agreement. R81-96 (Addendum A). In
particular, the parties agreed that if Mr. Richardson made payments for child
support and restitution during the period of time between arraignment and
sentencing, the State would recommend that Mr. Richardson serve no jail time.
R81:6.
Initially, Mr. Richardson was to be sentenced on May 11, 2007, at which
time he was current in his child support and restitution payments pursuant to the
2

plea agreement. R99-100. However, through no fault of Mr. Richardson's,
sentencing was continued to August 17, 2007 because the presentence
investigation report was not completed. Id.
During sentencing on August 17, 2007, the State represented that Mr.
Richardson had not complied with the terms of the plea agreement between May
and August 2007, claiming he had failed to make child support and restitution
payments as agreed, and thus asked the district court to impose jail time. R122:26 (Addendum B). Both Mr. Richardson and his counsel disputed the State's
factual allegations that Mr. Richardson had breached the plea agreement. R 122:611. However, the district court effectively found Mr. Richardson in breach of the
plea agreement (R122:l 1-12) and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. R101-103.
Mr. Richardson timely filed his Notice of Appeal on September 12, 2008.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties' negotiated plea agreement in this case provided if Mr.
Richardson pled guilty as charged and made monthly child support and restitution
payments pending sentencing, the prosecutor would recommend no additional jail
time. R:81:6 (Addendum A). Mr. Richardson was initially to be sentenced on
May 11, 2007, at which time he was apparently current in his child support and
restitution payments pursuant to the plea agreement. R99-100; R211:2-6, 10-11
(Addendum B).
However, sentencing was continued to August 17, 2007, because the
presentence investigation report was not completed. Id. The continuance caused
3

Mr. Richardson to lose a business client because the client did not want to
continue a professional relationship with Mr. Richardson without knowing
whether or not he was going to be incarcerated and thus unavailable to meet the
client's business needs. R211:11. However, notwithstanding that financial
setback that resulted from sentencing being continued through no fault of Mr.
Richardson's, he continued working to build up his business and making monthly
payments to the best of his ability pending the new sentencing date. Id.
At the time of sentencing on August 17, 2007, the status of the payments
was disputed. The prosecutor represented that Mr. Richardson had made some
payments but they were insufficient. Rl22:2-3 (Addendum B). She further
stated that the accrued deficiency since the time of arraignment was about $1,700
and requested that he be ordered to serve some time in jail contrary to the plea
agreement. R122:3, 5.
Defense counsel explained to the court that Mr. Richardson had spent six
months in jail and was released about three months prior to his arraignment.
R122:6. Subsequent to his entry of plea, Mr. Richardson made payments every
month up until sentencing totaling $2,560. Id. at 6, 10. Defense counsel further
explained that Mr. Richardson had simply been unable to make full payments but
had paid what he could under the circumstances. Id}

1

Defense counsel initially requested a continuance, explaining to the district court
that Mr. Richardson had made diligent efforts to make the payments but had
experienced some health problems and was working to stabilize his business, and
further represented that Mr. Richardson would be completely current in his
4

Defense counsel further explained that Mr. Richardson had been diligent in
his efforts and had done what he could practically be expected to do. He had been
in constant contact both with the criminal non-support monitor from the Attorney
General's office and with his attorney; and defense counsel represented that if the
court would continue sentencing for a few more weeks Mr. Richardson would be
able to bring his payments current. Id. at 6-7. Because of Mr. Richardson's recent
and lengthy incarceration and the nature of his job as an independent contractor,
he needed some additional time to get back on his feet financially and bring his
payments current. Id. at 7-8.
Mr. Richardson explained to the district court his intent to pay lump sum
payments every opportunity he had. Id. at 8. He told the court how he was
working to make his business more financially successful, the potential
opportunities he had to increase his income significantly, and how those
circumstances would benefit his children. Id. at 9. Mr. Richardson explained that
his current efforts to develop his business would have a bigger payoff in the long
run and thereby be of greater benefit to his children than if he were to abandon
those efforts and alternatively find one or two minimal paying jobs. Id. Further,
Mr. Richardson had an opportunity to take two additional clients that would raise
his income to almost $9,000 per month. R122:9.

payments if the district court would continue sentencing a few weeks. R122:l-2
(Addendum B).
5

Mr. Richardson also explained that he had experienced some serious
medical problems with his prostate during the previous month such that he was
urinating blood. Id. His temporary financial difficulties were thus exacerbated by
the fact that he had no health insurance; he was working to provide that for both
himself and for his children. Id.
The district court rejected both Mr. Richardson's and his counsel's
representations, accepted the State's unilateral finding of breach, and found that he
had not complied with the plea agreement. Id. at 11. Accordingly, the district
court sentenced Mr. Richardson to 180 days in jail with credit for 51 days served.
Id. The court explained her belief that Mr, Richardson should serve the jail time
because, "I don't believe you get it. ... You just don't get it." The court then had
Mr. Richardson immediately taken into custody and declined his request to ask his
attorney a question. Id. at 13.
Additional facts will be cited herein as warranted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The due process clause contained in the Utah Constitution provides greater
protections than its federal counterpart in several instances. In light of the
fundamental liberty interests at stake, a court should not make a finding, implicit
or express, that a defendant breached a plea agreement based solely on the State's
unilateral finding of breach, as the court did in this case. The material facts
relative to that issue were disputed and Mr. Richardson's Ml performance may
have been excused based on the State's comparative negligence, Mr. Richardson's
6

substantial performance, and the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability.
Further, even in a civil forum where the civil interests involved are not nearly as
important as the fundamental liberty interests at stake in a criminal proceeding,
Mr. Richardson would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question
of breach.
If Mr. Richardson did not breach the plea agreement, he was deprived of its
benefit such that the State did materially breach that agreement when it
recommended that Mr. Richardson serve jail time contrary to the plea agreement.
In that event, Mr. Richardson is entitled to have his plea withdrawn.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. RICHARDSON WAS DENIED HIS STATE AND FEDERAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE DISTRICT
COURT FOUND HIM IN BREACH OF THE PLEA
AGREEMENT BASED ON THE STATE'S UNILATERAL
REPRESENTATIONS.
A. The State Due Process Clause Requires an Evidentiary Hearing
Before a Finding of Breach Can Be Made.
Principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of a plea agreement.

State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386-87 (Utah App. 1997). However, once a
defendant has been induced to enter a guilty plea in reliance upon promises
contained in a plea agreement, important constitutional rights, particularly rights to
due process of law, are also implicated. Mabry v. Johnson, 461 U.S. 504, 508-9
(1984). Therefore, allowing the State to make a unilateral finding of breach and
not affording a defendant the opportunity to present evidence in his defense,
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particularly when the relevant facts are in dispute as in this case, is a violation of
both the Utah and the federal due process clauses.
Particularly under the state due process provision, a defendant accused of
being in breach of a plea agreement must be permitted to present evidence of
compliance prior to his liberty being taken as a result of the alleged breach.
Simply allowing the State to unilaterally find breach without presenting any
evidence of the same or permitting the defendant to defend himself against the
allegations of breach is a violation of state due process, especially when a
deprivation of liberty is the consequence for the defendant's breach.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The Utah
Supreme Court has found greater protection in this state provision than its federal
counterpart. See, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (explaining
eyewitness identification testimony is subject to greater scrutiny under the state
provision); Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (inmate had
right to state due process at Board of Pardons hearing, which right is not
recognized under the federal constitution); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272
(Utah 1988) (finding statutory provisions regarding guilty and mentally ill
arbitrary and capricious in violation of state due process).
Plea agreements are not mere civil contracts. They are agreements that are
contractual in nature but that affect fundamental liberty interests in a profound
way. In other words, the interest at stake is not merely money. It is the
8

defendant's freedom. Therefore, plea agreements "are binding on the parties and
the court once the plea is entered and accepted[,]" {State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294,
1304 (Utah 1986)), but in a manner that implicates constitutional guarantees to
due process of law. In light of the fundamental liberty interests at stake, mere
allegations that a defendant breached the plea agreement such as those proffered
here, are insufficient to justify the taking of a defendant's liberty.
Given the fact that at a hearing before the Board of Pardons where liberty is
at stake, the state due process provision affords an incarcerated inmate greater due
process protections than those afforded to him under the federal due process clause
{Foote v. Board of Pardons, supra), it logically and justly follows that a defendant
whose liberty will be taken as a result of his alleged breach of a plea agreement,
should be afforded similar if not greater due process protections in determining
whether a breach of the plea agreement in fact occurred. Simply allowing the
State to make a unilateral finding of breach, as occurred in this case, is
fundamentally unfair. Moreover, adopting such a one-sided approach in favor of
the government is unacceptable and therefore violates the due process clause
contained in the Utah Constitution.
Particularly in light of the thoughtful way the Utah due process clause has
been distinguished from the federal provision and carefully shaped by our
appellate courts to provide even greater protections as demonstrated by the
precedent set forth herein, it is consistent with that rationale to conclude that due
process under the Utah Constitution both affords and requires a defendant a fair
9

opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in his defense so he can rebut the
State's allegations that he breached the plea agreement. This conclusion accords
with basic principles of fundamental fairness. It simply is not fair or just to
deprive a party of the right to defend him or herself against allegations, especially
when the consequence of that deprivation is incarceration, as in this case.
Therefore, when the facts are disputed as they are here, at a minimum the
defendant should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question of breach.
An evidentiary hearing that takes into account important constitutional protections
as well as applicable contract principles would afford an allegedly breaching
defendant requisite due process protections. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted this logical and fundamentally fair approach several years ago:
We believe that one requisite safeguard of a defendant's rights is a judicial
determination, based on adequate evidence, of a defendant's breach of a
plea agreement. The question of a defendant's breach is not an issue to be
finally determined unilaterally by the government. If the [record] reveal[s]
a factual dispute on the issue of breach, the district court must hold a
hearing to resolve the factual issues. If the [record] reveal[s] no disputed
factual issues, no hearing is necessary and the court may determine the
issue of breach as a matter of law. We also believe that constitutional
principles of fairness also require that once the government acknowledges
the existence of an agreement, the government has the burden of
establishing a breach by the defendant if the agreement is to be considered
unenforceable.
United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (explaining because important
due process rights are involved in the context of plea agreements, there must be

10

"safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due under the
circumstances").
Although the Court did not deal directly with this issue in Santobello, the
principles articulated therein support a finding that an evidentiary hearing on the
question of breach is also required under the federal due process provision.
However, that Mr. Richardson is entitled to such a hearing is a given under the
more protective state due process clause.
In this case, whether Mr. Richardson committed a material breach of the
plea agreement is hotly disputed and not known or provable one way or the other
from the sparse record. Both he and his counsel raised arguments implicitly
supporting a finding of substantial performance, impossibility or impracticability
of performance, and comparative negligence on the part of the State for delaying
completion of the presentence investigation report, which delay cost Mr.
Richardson a job opportunity with a value of $1,600 per month, and thereby made
it impossible to perform within the short period of time allotted. R 122:8, 10-11.

2

Under contract law, impossibility or impracticability are doctrines that excuse
performance. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 815
(Utah 1992). "Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is
deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract
and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the
obligation impossible or highly impracticable." Western Properties v. Southern
Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App. 1989).
3

"[W]here plaintiffs negligent conduct was a contributing factor in causing the
injury, comparative negligence becomes a defense for the defendant." Acculog,
Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original).
11

However, the record is insufficient to make any determination about Mr.
Richardson's income, his ability to increase his income, his expenses, or his ability
to meet his monthly $800 obligation under the plea agreement. The record is also
insufficient to make any determination regarding the State's comparative
negligence. Rather than hear and consider such evidence prior to making any
conclusions about breach, the district court simply adopted the State's unilateral
finding that Mr. Richardson had failed to comply. As a direct consequence, Mr.
Richardson was deprived of his liberty contrary to the express terms of the plea
agreement, which deprivation seems counterproductive at best as, in addition to
the loss of his freedom, the district court's willingness to simply adopt the State's
unilateral finding of breach cost Mr. Richardson job opportunities and thereby set
him even further back financially and thus deprived his children of his financial
support. This liberty interest is too important and fundamental, particularly under
the more protective provision in the Utah Constitution, to allow the State to make
a unilateral determination of breach as they did here.
Accordingly, the district court deprived Mr. Richardson of his liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Utah Constitution.
B. Even in a Civil Proceeding, Mr. Richardson Was Entitled to a
Hearing on the Issue of Breach.
Had the plea agreement in this case been a mere civil contract, the law
would still have afforded Mr. Richardson an evidentiary hearing on the question of
breach. As this Court previously explained in another case, "What constitutes a
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material breach is a question of fact." Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206,
1209 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food
& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d
1231 (Utah 1995) ("Whether a party has materially breached a lease is generally a
question of fact for the fact finder")).
In a criminal case, the liberty interests at stake are much more important
and fundamental than those implicated in a civil case where the remedy for
material breach is damages or rescission of the contract, not the breaching party's
loss of freedom. It would be nonsensical to conclude that while Mr. Richardson
would have been allowed to defend himself against the State's allegations in a
civil forum, he was not allowed to do so in a proceeding where the consequence
for breach was the fundamental right to be free.
Therefore, Mr. Richardson should have been permitted the opportunity to
defend himself against the State's allegations of breach and, given the fact that
these basic protections are provided even in a civil proceeding and in light of the
case law cited herein, the district court's failure to failure to afford him the chance
to defend himself was plain error.
II.

IF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REVEALS THAT MR.
RICHARDSON DID NOT MATERIALLY BREACH THE PLEA
AGREEMENT, THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE RESCINDED
AND HIS PLEA WITHDRAWN.
Based upon the parties' representations at the time of sentencing, Mr.

Richardson may have substantially performed his obligations under the plea
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agreement. R211:2-3, 6-11. Further, any lack of full performance may well be
justified due to the State's comparative negligence and the doctrines of
impossibility or impracticability. Id.
While contract law provides a "useful analytical framework in cases
involving plea agreements ... [and] cannot be blindly incorporated into the
criminal law in the area of plea bargaining^]"4 certainly if the State's action or
inaction or other unforeseen circumstances make it impracticable for a defendant
to perform as agreed, contract doctrines excusing the defendant's performance
should apply, especially given the more weighty liberty interests involved.
According to Mr. Richardson's statements made during the sentencing
hearing, he was current in his payment obligations in May 2007 when sentencing
was originally supposed to occur. R:211:10-11. The State seemed to agree,
noting that post-arraignment arrearages did not begin to accrue until May 2007
when Mr. Richardson was originally scheduled to be sentenced. R211:2-3. The
State's failure to have the presentence investigation report timely completed at that
time cost him a job opportunity and thereby made it temporarily impossible for
him to fully meet his payment obligation although he did continue to make
monthly payments. Id.
Even though a district court is not bound to follow a prosecutor's
recommendation, a defendant is still entitled to the benefit of his plea agreement
such that the State must perform its obligations therein. State v. Bero, 645 P.2d
4

State v. Stringham^ 17 P.3d at 1156 (citations and some punctuation omitted).
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44, 46-7 (Utah 1982). In other words, if Mr. Richardson did not materially breach
the plea agreement and the contract doctrines of substantial performance,
comparative negligence, or impossibility or impracticability apply, he was entitled
to the State's specific performance of its obligations under the plea agreement.
If Mr. Richardson is not in breach, the State's failure to specifically
perform as agreed constitutes a material breach on the State's part that severely
prejudiced Mr. Richardson and requires rescission of the entire agreement such
that Mr. Richardson's plea should be withdrawn and he should be placed back in a
pre-trial position as if his plea had never been entered. Coalville City v. Lundgren,
930 P.2d at 1210 (discussing the general right of rescission a party has when there
has been a material breach); see also, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971) ("when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
the prosecutor so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled"); State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1982)
(explaining that when there has been a misunderstanding between the parties about
the terms of the plea agreement, the error "can be most easily corrected by placing
the parties in their original positions"); accord, State v. Bickley, 60 P.3d 582, 584
(Utah App. 2002).
Accordingly, Mr. Richardson should be permitted to present evidence on
the question of breach. If it is then determined that he did not materially breach
the plea agreement and/or that contract doctrines excusing his performance in
whole or in part apply, his guilty plea in this case should be withdrawn.
15

CONCLUSION
Mr. Richardson respectfully requests this Court to find that the due process
clause contained in the Utah Constitution in particular, and also the due process
clause set forth in the federal constitution, require that Mr. Richardson be given
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense at an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether or not he breached the plea agreement in this matter. At such
hearing, the district court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding whether there has been a material breach by either party and further
analyze the facts within the legal doctrines of substantial performance, the State's
comparative negligence, and impossibility or impracticability.
Accordingly, Mr. Richardson respectfully requests that this matter be
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of breach.
Respectfully submitted this 3 rd day of March, 2008.

^Arry

Jennifer K .Kjowans /
Attorney for Mr. Richardson
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Addendum A

ANN ROZYCKI #7609
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
160 East 300 South
P.O.Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801)366-0199
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA
AND
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
\T

V.

Criminal No. 051906048FS
DARIN RAY RICHARDSON,
Judge: JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Defendant.

I, DARIN RAY RICHARDSON, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes:

Statement in Advance of Guilty Plea - Revised May 2005

1

Crime & Statutory

Degree

Punishment

Provision

Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

A.

Criminal Non-Support, Utah Code

3rd Degree

0-5 years Utah State Prison, $5,000

Annotated §76-7-201

Felony

fine.

I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime to which I am pleading guilty.

I am pleading to Count I of the Information.

The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty are:
a. That during the time period charged, the Defendant had a child who was then
under 18 years of age;
b. That the Defendant knowingly failed to provide for the support of the child;
c. That during this time period, the child was in needy circumstances or would
have been in needy circumstances had it not been for support provided by others, and not on
Defendant's behalf, and;
d. That the Defendant committed the offense of criminal non-support in each of
18 individual months in any 24 month period that extended beyond May 3, 1999, and/or had a
child support arrearage in excess of $10,000.00, and/or had been previously convicted of
Criminal Non-support.

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of

Statement in Advance of Guilty Plea - Revised May 2005

2

other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept
my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the offense to which I am pleading guilty:
During the time period from December 1, 2002, through August 31, 2005,1 was the natural
parent of Dillon Ray Richardson, born April 8,1998. I knew that I had the obligation to
provide support for my child and I failed to provide support although I had the means or
the ability to obtain the means to do so. My child was in needy circumstances or would
have been in needy circumstances but for the support provide by others and not on my
behalf. I failed to provide support in at least 18 months in a 24 month period, and my total
child support arrears exceed $10,000.00.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give
up all the following rights:
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b)
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could compel the
attendance of defense and/or other witnesses of my choosing. If I could not afford to pay for the
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be instructed to not hold mv refusal to testify against me.
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Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. If I choose to
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial.
At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning
that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be
admitting that I committed each element of the crime stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge,
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that if I plead guilty, my right to
appeal is limited and may be waived entirely depending on the nature of the appeal.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Right to Counsel
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for all or a portion of the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done so
knowingly and voluntarily. I certify that I have read this statement or had it read to me and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea.
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Gretchen P. Havner, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association. My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights,
and the consequences of my guilty plea.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum and minimum sentence that may be imposed
for each crime to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that
carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that
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crime. I know my sentence may include a term of incarceration in jail or prison, a fine, or both.
I know that in addition to any fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes,
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed or conduct for which I
have agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading
guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences
would be inappropriate.
Plea Bargain
My plea of guilty is the result of prior plea discussions conducted between my attorney,
on my behalf, or myself if I am not represented by counsel, and the prosecutor from the Utah
Attorney General's Office. The terms of the plea negotiation are as follows:
A. I will enter a guilty plea to Count I of the Information.
B. I will pay victim restitution in the amount of all child support arrears (principal
and interest) that accrue through the date of sentencing. As of today's date, my child
support arrears total $21,854.68 (principal and interest). The restitution is to be
distributed as follows:
i) The State of Utah on behalf of Melissa A. Irvin
(principal and interest)

$11,320.68

ii) The State of Utah
(reimbursement of public assistance principal only)

$10,534.00

I understand that the restitution judgment shall accrue interest as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38a-401(4) (2001). At my request, a copy of the Debt Computation used to
calculate the restitution amount agreed to is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
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C. Further, the prosecutor has agreed that if I plead guilty pursuant to this plea
agreement and make my child support payments pending sentencing, the prosecutor will
recommend at the time of sentencing that I be placed on Probation to Adult Probation and
Parole, and a criminal non-support monitor from the Attorney General's Office with the
general terms of probation and these additional conditions:
a. No additional jail time if I make my on-going child support payments
beginning with February 2007 and my restitution payments as outlined.
b. I shall pay ongoing child support as required by any valid Order now existing or
that is discovered or established during the term of my probation, presently in the amount
of $520.00 per month. In the event my ongoing support is reduced during the probation
period, I will continue to pay at the same amount with the difference being applied as
additional restitution.
c. I shall make restitution payments of at least $280.00 per month.
d. I shall make all payments through the Office of Recovery Services at P.O. Box
45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011 by wage withhold put in place by the Office. Any
check or money order that I send in will contain my ORS Case Number(s) to assist in
proper crediting. M Y FIRST MONTHLY RESTITUTION PAYMENT WILL BE DUE M A R C H 30,
2007.
f. I understand that the Office of Recovery Services may intercept and apply any
income tax refunds to child support arrearage incurred prior to the signing of this
Stipulation. I understand that intercepted taxes may apply to my child support arrears,
but the receipt of intercepted taxes by ORS does not entitle me to miss a monthly
restitution payment.
g. In the event that a wage withhold is in place and the amount withheld is
insufficient to cover the my monthly payment, it will be the my responsibility to make up
any shortages to satisfy the requirements of the order.
h. I am to obtain and maintain full-time (at least 40 hours per week), verifiable
employment throughout the period of my probation. Monitoring will be made by Adult
Probation and Parole and by Anna M. Gamangasso, Criminal Non-support Monitor, or
successor, of the Attorney General's Office, for the State of Utah. In the event that I am
unable to maintain full-time employment, I will provide reports of efforts made to secure
employment to the monitors.
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i. I will advise Adult Probation and Parole and Anna M. Gamangasso, Criminal
Non-support Monitor, or successor, of the Attorney General's Office, in writing of any
change of address or employment within 10 days of such change.

Trial Judge Not Bound
I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the Judge. I also know that
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge may do are not binding on the
Judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those
contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am
years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that any request to withdraw my plea of guilty must be done by
motion and prior to the sentence being announced. I further understand that my plea may
only be withdrawn by leave of the Court and based upon a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made.
Dated this

day of

, 2007.

DARIN RAY RICHARDSON
Defendant
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Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for DARIN RAY RICHARDSON, the Defendant above,
and that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with
him and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the Defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

GRETCHEN P. HAVNER
Attorney for Defendant
Bar No.
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against DARIN RAY
RICHARDSON, Defendant. I have reviewed this Statement ofDefendant and find that the factual basis
of the Defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered Defendant.

The plea

negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence
would support the conviction of Defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and that the
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

ANN ROZYCKI
Prosecutor
Bar No. 7609
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ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the Defendant
and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and
finds that the Defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's guilty plea to the crime set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

day of

, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Addendum B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE DIVISION, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 051906048

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Appellate Case No. 20070747-CA
DARIN RAY RICHARDSON,
Defendant.
SENTENCING AUGUST 17, 2007
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; AUGUST 17, 2007

2

HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff

ANN C. ROZYCKI

4

For the Defendant

GRETCHEN P. HAVNER

MS. HAVNER:

6
7

Your Honor , my next matter is that of

Darin Richardson.

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. ROZYCKI :

10

And for the state?
Ann Rozycki for the State, Your

Honor

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. HAVNER:

13

Okay.
Yes, Your ]Honor, this is Mr.

Richa rdson.
THE COURT:

14

Mr. Richard son, you're before me today

15

for s entencing.

16

of criminal non-support.

17

repor t.

18
19

You entered a pl<sa of guilty to the charge
I' ve reviewed the pre-sentence

Ms. Havner, have you an<d Mr. Richa rdson reviewed
that as well?

20

MS. HAVNER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. ROZYCKI :

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. HAVNER:

25

E E D I N G S

P R O C

5

We have.
Ms. Rozycki ?
Yes, Your Honor.

Okay.
Well, Your Honor, we are requesting

that you consider con tinuing this sentencing until October.
1

1

Mr. Richardson indicates to me that he has an outstanding -

2

he's an independent contractor that he has an outstanding

3

bill that should be paid on August 28 that he should be able

4

to pay $2,400 to the court by September 15, which would bring

5

him in full compliance.

6

permission of the court.

7

is working on getting his business more stabilized, and

8

assures me that he will be able to be completely current by

9

the next court date.

10

THE COURT:

He has been living in Texas with the
He has had some health issues, but

Did we set - I set a schedule he was to

11

pay $320 ongoing - 520 ongoing, $280 arrearages to the Office

12

of Recovery Services?

13

MS. ROZYCKI:

That's correct, Your Honor, and he

14

hasn't.

Your Honor, when we were here on sentencing we were

15

scheduled for sentencing in May on the 11th, and at that

16

point in time the court had not received the pre-sentence

17

report.

18

THE COURT:

Right.

19

MS. ROZYCKI:

We actually gave him this far out

20

because he came to the court with a card saying he had full-

21

time employment and a plan to pay and he had just caught up

22

when he was supposed to have paid in March and April under

23

the plea bargain.

24

was never a [inaudible] in place.

25

Recovery Services contacted him and attempted to reach that

The employment did not work out.

There

He indicated after

1

employer that he was a 1099 independent contractor.

2

basically he was supposed to make the May payments still

3

which he didn't.

4

Services called him.

5

of when he was supposed to pay and he paid $320.

6

come in for August yet.

7
8

So

June he paid $200 on his own after Recovery
In July they called him to remind him

THE COURT:

Nothing's

He's had plenty of time.

So what are the arrearages now just

since May?

9

MS. ROZYCKI:

Just since May?

It would be about

10 I $1,700 with August and then August [inaudible] as well.

The

11

victim is present again as she was last time, Your Honor, to

12

address the Court and this is not the first time and this

13

case was filed in 2005.

14

actually called into the office to find out about the case

15

being filed, and no payments came in at all until at court

16

here in December of 2006.

17

we've heard there is a job, there is something going on, and

18

I can - just give me a little more time and I can do

19

something.

20

sentenced today.
THE COURT:

22

MS. ROZYCKI:

24
25

And this is not the first time

I think he's had that opportunity and should be

21

23

At that time in September of 2005 he

Does the victim wish to speak now?
She does wish to speak to the court,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Ms. Haver, if you and Mr.

Richardson could go over to the table.

1

MS. HAVNER:

2

MS. IRVIN:

3

We will, Your Honor.
I'm Melissa Irvin.

I'm Joel

Richardson's mother and for the past four years we have been

4 I doing without a lot of things.

I've gone to the church

5

several times in the last three years to get help and food

6

and my rent paid.

7

years to try to sustain a house for him and give him scouting

8

and give him all the things that he needs as a young man.

9

And I don't want excuses anymore and we have both - him and I

I have worked very hard the last three

10

have both suffered.

We love each other, me and Dillon, very

11

much, have a great relationship, strong bond, but there's a

12

lot of things we could have used, a lot of help we could have

13

used, a lot of extra clothes or just activities he could have

14 I used to strengthen his life better as a young man growing up
15

to be a man.

And I just think that the Court should know

16

that this has all been a nightmare for both of us, me and my

17

son, and I don't think Mr. Richardson intends on helping my

18

son or myself.

19

issue but he hasn't tried to do that either.

And, well, I know visitation is a separate

All right.

That's all.

20

THE COURT:

Thank you.

21

What is the State's recommendation, Ms. Rozycki?

22

MS. ROZYCKI:

Your Honor, when we were here last

23

time pursuant to the plea bargain had he made payments we

24

were going to recommend to the court [inaudible].

25

Court was quite firm with him at that point in time that we

I know the

1

had concerns because of the length of his criminal history

2

and whether or not he would comply.

And part of the reason

3 I that the State recommended giving him this 90 days was to see
4

what he would do.

5

still inclined to follow that AP&P recommendation of

6

probation that it can't be just court probation.

7

he's shown that he could not be supervised by just a monitor

8

in our office alone.

9

recommendation and it's addressed in the pre-sentence report.

10

And I think that the 90 days that they're recommending is the

11

minimal jail time that should be imposed at this point.

12

actually has served 51 days on this case and through all of

13

this he's still not getting that he needs to step up to the

14

plate and comply with a full-time verifiable employment and

15

make his child support payments.

16

that time and that when he is released from incarceration

17

that he is required to maintain - obtain and maintain full-

18

time employment and that he pays ongoing child support and

19

that amount towards arrears.

20

So our position is that if the Court is

I think

And I believe that is AP&P's

He

We ask that he does serve

And part of the concern, Your Honor, for the

21

employment is and I think this comes out in AP&P's report is

22

that it's - he's been very deceptive about it.

23

really sure what he's doing or where.

24

their report on page 3 that he says he has no verifiable

25

income and he's had, supposedly he's owned security companies

No one is

AP&P addresses it in

1

and online escort services.

2

they find out that on page 7 that he says he has an income of

3

$2,500 a month, but they're not sure how because he doesn't

4

have employment.

5

forthright and up front and in place where that money could

6

come in regularly.

It's never been - he's never been

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. HAVNER:

9
10

And then later in the report

Ms. Havner.
Well, Your Honor, I disagree with Ms.

Rozycki's characterization of what Mr. Richardson has done.
He did six months in jail.

He got out in December.

11 I then he has made substantial payments.

Since

He made a payment in

12

December, March, April, May, June and July which are the most

13

consistent payments that he's made throughout this entire

14

case.

15

entered the plea agreement.

16

full amount of payments that he agreed, but he has made a

17

payment every single month that he - since he entered his

18

plea.

19

this case, substantial commitment that he is going to start

20

paying on this case.

21

He has made a payment every single month since we
He hasn't been able to make the

And I think that does show substantial commitment to

I disagree with the characterization that he cannot

22

be supervised.

He has been in contact with their agency.

23

They indicated that they called him and reminded him that he

24

needed to make payments and that he did so quickly after

25

that.

Obviously they know where he is.

Obviously they can

1

get in contact with him.

2

date since getting out of jail.

3

me both via email and via phone.

4

get in contact with him and have had regular contact with Mr.

5

Richardson.

6

He's come to every single court
He's always in contact with
I've always known where to

So I believe that what the victim's saying is

7

accurate that for a long period of time that Darin did not

8

pay his child support and that they need the money and I

9

think he's showing now that he actually is trying and I don't

10

see the benefit to the victim to putting Darin back into jail

11

for another 90 days so that when he gets out he has to start

12

all the way over again.

13

Darin does not have a full-time verifiable job

14

because he is an independent contractor through various

15

groups where he runs their website.

16

names of them and how he's been helping them out.

17

been paying every single month and I believe that he will

18

continue to do so.

19

gets paid oftentimes in lump sums which has made it difficult

20

for him to make these payments every single month, but he

21

assures me that he is going to be paid another lump sum at

And he can tell you the
But he has

Because of the nature of his business he

22 I the end of August that he will be able to pay $2,400 by
23

September 15 which would bring him more than in compliance

24

with what this court has ordered and that's the reason that

25

we're asking for this continuance through October.

We're not
7

1

asking you to sentence him today without him completing what

2

he says he will do.

3

additional time to show to you that he is serious about doing

4

this, that he is making a commitment this time that he has

5

not in the past.

6

change of heart and that he realizes how important this is.

7

I've worked with him extensively on this case and I think he

8

understands what he needs to do, and I believe sincerely,

9

Your Honor, that he is trying and that he will continue to

We're asking you to give him some

I think that Mr. Richardson has had a

10

try.

That's the reason that he's here today.

That's the

11

reason that he's come to all the court dates in the past.

12

THE COURT:

Thank you.

13

Mr. Richardson, anything you wish to say?

14

MR. RICHARDSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

I have guite a

15

bit to say.

16

concerns were that I would not be able to pay the full

17

amount, the $21,000 over the 36 month probation.

18

$800 was the minimum payment that I required to pay.

19

intended to pay lump sums every opportunity I had.

20

The last time I was before you a couple of your

To me that
I fully

Now the job that initially I took when I was last

21

before you was [inaudible] cycle in Beaumont, Texas.

22

maintain a website - I specialize in search engine

23

optimization.

24

They pay me $1,600 a month or $400 a week.

25

took about 10 hours of work per week.

I

I have done it number one in Google ranking.
That one client

I have the opportunity

1

to take on two other clients with the potential could bring

2

in $2,200 a week doing what I do.

3

I recently got new equipment, Microsoft

4

certification with respect to my own education, nobody has

5

even mentioned my daughter in Texas.

6

daughter.

7

been working.

8

graduate and start working.

9

Your Honor, I'm very respectful with your order and I've seen

I have a two-year old

She just turned two July 25th.

Her mom has not

She's going to dental school and is about to
If I'm in Utah and believe me,

10

other people mess up and I'm not about to do that.

11

planned every option.

12

Apollo Drive has offered me a room here if necessary.

13

heart is in Texas with Mary and my daughter.

14

there.

15

I have

My former roommate in Salt Lake on
My

My work is

One of your other concerns was how would you get me

16

back here, but you don't need to get me back here.

I'm back

17

here for my son and I on my own have thought of ways to make

18

things better with the state.

19

account at the University Credit Union set up and I want to

20

set it up so that they would do direct deposit instead of me

21

having to send in payments of $400 every other Friday.

22

a medical problem in late July.

23

some prostate problems and I don't have medical insurance.

24

So when I looked into medical insurance it was $305 for me or

25

$567 for me, Dillon and Riley.

I mean, I've got a bank

I had

I was urinating blood, had

So that's another area that

1

I'm focusing on which is over and above the $800.

2

In April when I was required to come up with $2,780

3

on a short period of time, I was able to do that.

And I

4

literally lived on $20 a week t.v. dinners and worked hard in

5

this city doing labor to come up - to get in a position where

6

I could get a new laptop and do what I do.

7

work two $10 an hour jobs and 10 years from now when Dillon

8

is 18, you know, the child support will be paid, but I won't

9

have any college funds set up for him, I won't have any real

I mean, I could

10

help for him.

I'm looking at making real money.

I don't

11

want to just survive and pay my child support and see

12

my kids every other weekend.

13

that's why I'm back and forth.

14

MS. HAVNER:

I want to have a future.

And

I mean, travel costs, trying-

Your Honor, I think it's also

15

important to point out that since the time that he entered

16

his plea in March of this year he's paid $2,560 which is a

17

substantial amount of money in this case.

18

he's made a payment every single month.

19

that he is making an effort that maybe he has not in the

20

past.

21

MR. RICHARDSON:

And like I said,
I think this shows

I also would like to say that

22

Melissa has contacted me when I [inaudible] referring to May.

23

I mean, I was supposed to come back that afternoon and we

24

were supposed to address all these issues and I was supposed

25

to be told who at the AG's office was going to monitor my
10

1

case and who I report to, and you know, the agreement I

2

signed was that I would start paying $800 after sentencing

3

and then Gretchen called me on the lunch hour and said, well,

4

you know, we've continued it until August.

5

left me up in the air.

6

a wedding supply store in Houston, did not want to enter into

7

an agreement with me to handle their website because they

I mean it kind of

It kind of left me one of my clients,

8 I were not sure that I was going to be able to be there to
9

handle ongoing maintenance and such, so I missed out on that

10

opportunity.

11

sentence me today and make a, like part of the sentence that

12

I have to do certain thing within a 30 day period or this

13

will be the consequences, I won't let you down.

14

I won't let my son down.

15
16

But, Your Honor, if you, I mean, if you

THE COURT:

I guarantee

I will have that money.

Actually, Mr. Richardson, I already did

that.

17

MR. RICHARDSON:

18

THE COURT:

What's that?

I already did that and you didn't

19

comply.

I'm going to sentence you as follows.

I order you

20

to serve in indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of

21

zero to five years.

22

with credit for 51 days served.

23

to serve the balance.

24

through Adult Probation & Parole.

25

behavior.

I'm suspending all but 180 days of that
I am taking you into custody

Place you on 36 months probation
You're to be on good

That means you're not to come before this court or
11

1

any court in anything other than a minor traffic offense,

2

comply with all conditions placed upon you by AP&P, including

3

but not limited to having no contact whatsoever with the

4

victim.

5

$250.

6

probation.

7

subject to -

8
9

Fine of a surcharge of $5,000, attorney's fees of
I will suspend the fine upon successful completion of
Restitution is as follows: as of March 7, 2007

MS. ROZYCKI:

I have one update, Your Honor,

through August 16.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

MS. ROZYCKI:

12

THE COURT:

What is it?

It is $22,593.01.
Restitution as of today is $22,593.01.

13

Upon your release from custody you are to pay the following:

14

$520 per month ongoing, $280 a month arrearage.

15

paid through the Office of Recovery Services.

16

something we do all the time, but I know that AP&P and the

17

state can work through probation issues.

18
19

MS. ROZYCKI:

That's to be
This is not

We can, Your Honor, as long as you

allow our monitor to work with AP&P.

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HAVNER:

That is my order.
I have a couple things, Your Honor.

22

First of all, I'm asking and maybe you said this, but I want

23

the money to go through ORS.

24

where AP&P -

25

MS. ROZYCKI:

I've had problems in the past

It is.
12

1

MS. HAVNER:

Okay.

Also, I'm requesting that you

2

consider giving Mr. Richardson additional credit towards the

3

time that he did.

4

that we came before the court and requested that he be

5

released on this matter so that he would be eligible for

6

ankle monitor.

The reason that the credit is 51 days is

He was not.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. ROZYCKI:

9
10
11
12

He continued to serve m

He was extradited I think that time was on his other

offense [inaudible].
MS. HAVNER:

It was, but he was held on this case

as well during that time period.
THE COURT:

I'm not giving him credit for anything

13

but 51 days.

14

Richardson, I don't believe you get it.

15

don't get it.

16

I want him to serve jail time because, Mr.

MR. RICHARDSON:

Serious.

You just

Your Honor, I do get it.

17

another child that I've been trying to take care of.

18

another - I want to ask you, may I ask my attorney?

19

jail.

THE COURT:

I have
I have

No, I'm just going to have you taken

20

into custody.

21

the benefit of trying to make things work and you haven't

22

(inaudible).

23

I mean, you've made choices, I've given you

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

24
25
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